The politics of devolution

Introduction

This unit, which contains material from the current Open University second level Politics course DD203 Power, Equality and Dissent, is pitched at the intermediate level. It should take you about 8 hours to study if you attempt the recommended exercises and make summary notes of its key points. Doing so will allow you to practise the crucial academic skill of summary and précis – extracting the gist of an argument – which will be of particular help if you go on to study in related areas: perhaps the related politics units on the OpenLearn website or in the Open University courses from which they come.

The politics of devolution

1 The politics of devoloution: introduction

This unit examines the politics of devolution and the relationships between the various nations that constitute the UK. It does so by examining the transformation of the UK from a centralised unitary state into a decentralised unitary state. (If you want a quick summary of the terms of devolution, you will find one in Section 5.5.) The unit shows how the devolution process grew out of a long history, and how it is continuing in the context of ongoing political change in Britain, Europe and a world increasingly shaped by the forces of globalisation. A central theme of the discussion to follow is the relation between the centre and the periphery: that is, the contrast between those spaces where power and resources tend to concentrate (the political centre) and those other areas which somehow become or are considered marginal (the periphery).

Before going any further, lets define some possibly unfamiliar key terms. To call the UK a unitary state is to say that it is one in which political power ultimately resides in a central and sovereign UK parliament. A unitary state, embracing one large political unit, can be contrasted to a federal state, comprising several political units. Unlike in a unitary state, the units of a federal state are not mere local or regional authorities subordinate to a dominant central power. Such units that form a federation are states with state rights themselves (Burgess and Gagnon, 1993, p. 5). As Elazar (1997, p. 12) argues, ‘the very essence of federation as a particular form of union is self-rule plus shared rule’. Among many others, the UK, Spain, Italy and France are unitary states, while Germany, Canada, the United States of America, Switzerland and India are federal states.

A further relevant distinction, which impacts on the study of centre–periphery relations in the UK, concerns the difference between centralised and decentralised unitary states. A centralised unitary state, which governs its peoples from a central sovereign parliament, excludes the possibility of devolving any substantial powers to its territorially based minority national or ethnic groups. In some cases, the state may appoint a special representative for the area, responsible for the distribution of state subsidies and the administration of the area or region, but such a representative is usually accountable to the central parliament, not to a regional government (Guibernau, 1999, p. 35). In contrast, a decentralised unitary state does devolve some powers to regionally elected institutions while ultimately maintaining the sovereignty of its central parliament. The degree of devolution varies in each case. It ranges from very minor decentralisation structures, as illustrated by the division of France into départements, through the considerable political autonomy enjoyed by the 17 autonomous communities created in Spain after 1978, to the post-1997 devolution model adopted by the UK which provides differential degrees of political autonomy to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Centre–periphery relations in the UK are best explored by reference to the origins of modern Britain and the different histories of the nations that make up the contemporary UK. The complexity in this relationship can be illustrated by three approaches. First, by considering the connection between England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the various regions within them. Second, by examining the relationship between London and other UK cities. Third, by exploring the internal complexities that arise from social, ethnic and religious differences and interests in the UK. Such complexities can be found within both the centre and the periphery.

This unit also considers the politics of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and looks at the prospects for regional government in England. At a supra-state level, centre–periphery relations are altered by the UK’s membership of the European Union as regionalism plays an increasing role within the EU.

Summary

State models can be divided according to whether power and sovereignty are or are not shared and devolved in the following ways:

• Unitary state. All powers reside in a central sovereign parliament. Power is not shared.

• Federal state. Constituted by sovereign units. Power is divided between one central and several regional governments.

• Centralised state. Excludes any form of devolution to its minority national and ethnic groups.

• Decentralised state. Prepared to devolve some powers to regionally elected institutions while retaining sovereignty in its central parliament.

2 The making of the UK

2.1 England

England played a dominant role in the medieval history of Britain, and the history of the UK is undoubtedly the history of the political and cultural domination of the English nation over those of Scotland, Wales and Ireland. In the making of the UK, each component nation played a different role: the English and Scottish kingdoms, the incorporation of Wales into the English Crown, and the subjugation of Ireland. The making of the UK was complex and fraught with violent confrontations, particularly virulent in the case of Ireland.

England’s leading role in the creation of Britain can partly be explained by its ability, in the latter part of the Anglo-Saxon period, to annex and control smaller kingdoms under the rule of a single monarch. England enjoyed a common legal and fiscal framework, as well as a single church organisation (Llobera, 1994, p. 23). The Viking invasions did not radically change this picture nor erode the sense of English identity that had already been created. It is widely accepted that England was ‘one of the first European countries to exhibit a sense of unity and identity, and that this was achieved long before the [Norman] Conquest. By the ninth century Alfred could be referred to as king of the English’ (Reynolds, 1984; Greenfeld, 1992). It is remarkable that the Norman invasion of England in 1066, and the subsequent elimination of the indigenous aristocracy, did not bring about the centrifugal effects typical of feudalism in other Western European countries. Yet as William I superimposed an alien dynasty and aristocracy on an already structured and unified kingdom, the consequence of such a move was that provincial dynasties able to challenge the central power of the monarchy were eliminated in post-Norman England.

2 The making of the UK

2.2 Scotland

Having enjoyed political independence until 1707, the survival of many of Scotland’s institutions – notably its systems of law, religion and education – after Union with England contributed to the preservation of its singular identity. The different way in which Scotland was incorporated into the UK, through a monarchical take-over rather than by conquest (as was the case in Wales and Ireland), may account for the lesser impact the development of the UK exerted on Scottish distinctiveness.

In 1296, Edward I forced the submission of John Balliol, King of Scotland, with ease. Subsequently, William Wallace led national resistance against the English, winning the Battle of Stirling Bridge (1297), losing at Falkirk (1298) and executed in London (1305).

In 1306, Robert Bruce (Robert I) rose in revolt and was crowned the King of Scots, defeating the English army of Edward II at Bannockburn (1314). In 1320, the Scots Nobles sent a letter to Pope John XXII to persuade him of the legitimacy of King Robert the Bruce. This was a patriotic address known as the Declaration of Arbroath, invariably quoted as the first nationalist statement in Western Europe. The Declaration referred to Robert the Bruce as ‘King of Scots’, not King of Scotland, portraying the image of a limited monarch of a people, not only an owner of the land. Successively, James VI, King of Scotland, became King James I of England in 1603, adopting the title of ‘King of Great Britain, France and Ireland’ in October 1604.

Following the Civil War and the beheading of Charles I, England was proclaimed a free Commonwealth ruled by the army under Oliver Cromwell’s leadership. Although Scotland immediately proclaimed King Charles II as monarch, Cromwell invaded and defeated Scotland to offset this. Subsequently, following the Restoration of the English monarchy in 1660, the Act of Union of Parliaments was passed in 1707 enacting a full and incorporating union between England and Scotland. This meant that the Scots finally lost their political independence.

In 1715, and again in 1745, the Jacobites attempted to break the Union, but were unsuccessful. Despite such opposition, it is open to debate whether the Scots consented to the Act of Union, or had it imposed upon them. Nonetheless, while Scotland was now governed at Westminster, the Union between England, Scotland and Wales did preserve the Kirk (the Scottish Church), as well as maintain distinctively Scottish forms of law and education, all of which contributed to a Scottish identity.

Figure 1: Presentation of the Treaty of the Union between England and Scotland to Queen Anne © National Galleries of Scotland

2 The making of the UK

2.3 Wales

In 1282, Edward I conquered Wales and the Statute of Rhuddlan (or Statute of Wales, 1284) established English rule. Rather than involve the assimilation of the Welsh by the English the conquest saw ‘a colonial system … established in those parts of Llywelyn’s Principality which were by 1284 in the hands of the king’ (Davies, 1991, p. 166). In 1400, Owain Glyndwr led the most outstanding and successful rising in Wales against the new order and the tyranny of the English border barons, which almost led to the re-establishment of Welsh rule. Glyndwr sought to create an independent Wales that would have its own independent church and educational structure through the establishment of a system of Welsh universities. However, the accession of the Welsh Tudor dynasty to the English throne, following Henry Tudor’s victory at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485, encouraged Welsh assimilation on the basis of equality with England. Wales was territorially structured according to the English model of the shires. Leading Welsh families held their land from the king, others became lease-holders and tenants after the English pattern, and the feudal aristocracy was received at the English court. But a deep breach, fostered by economic inequality, opened between landlord and tenant, one which remained unhealed for centuries.

The Act of Union of 1536 was in response to Henry VIII’s wish to incorporate Wales within his realm. It meant the complete administrative assimilation of Wales into the English system. Welsh customary law was abolished and English was established as the sole language of legal proceedings. In 1543 the Court of Great Session was constituted, a system of courts modelled on the practice already used in the three counties which, since 1284, had formed the municipality of North Wales. The Court of Great Session remained the system of higher courts of Wales until 1830, when, against considerable opposition, it was abolished.

Figure 2: Illustration of Owain Glyndwr, by permission of Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru/The National Library of Wales

The Catholic tradition died slowly in Wales under Elizabeth I and James I; Puritanism was strongly resisted and Oliver Cromwell had to employ oppressive measures to impose it. In the eighteenth century, Wales turned rapidly from the established church to embrace dissent with strong Calvinist leanings. In 1735, the church gathered large numbers of followers from the Church of England. This also helped contribute to the rise of an incipient Welsh nationalism, particularly as the desire to protect Welsh native culture from progressive Anglicisation rose in the eighteenth century.

The Industrial Revolution transformed Wales, threatening the traditional ways of rural life, leading to protests such as the Rebecca Riots in 1843. Industrialisation also prompted the radical exploitation of the mineral wealth of Wales, particularly coal, which additionally transformed the life of Welsh people. Chronic poverty and increasing unemployment intensified in Wales before and after the First World War, continuing almost unchecked until the Second World War as the Great Depression hit hard. After 1945, as the Labour government drew substantial support from its electoral socialist stronghold of South Wales, nationalisation prompted a full-scale programme of industrial development. Yet, while the Scottish Office had been established in 1885, the Welsh Office was only set up in 1964. Here, while the Welsh celebrated their national identity, particularly in cultural terms, the political integration of Wales within the English-dominated UK meant than ‘Welshness’ was not as distinctive a national force as was ‘Scottishness’ north of the border.

2 The making of the UK

2.4 Northern Ireland

Ireland was long considered a de facto province of England, a colonial possession dominated politically and militarily by its more powerful neighbour to the east. The English divided Ireland into counties for administrative purposes, introduced English law and established a Parliament in England and Ireland in 1297, within which only the Anglo-Irish were represented. By the fourteenth century Irish discrimination by the English had prompted widespread protests, which had resulted in a revival of the Irish language, law and culture, particularly as English power was seen to diminish. Yet, the recognition of Henry VIII as King of Ireland in 1541 led to the confiscation of monastic property and the isolation of would be rebels, many of whom had their lands confiscated. The beginnings of the Plantation of Ulster, the pronounced migration of Scots to the northern counties of Ireland, Ulster, dates from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Thus Ulster became a province dominated by Protestant, Scottish planters, while the native Irish, continuing to claim allegiance to the proscribed Catholic Church, became landless and displaced by the colonisers. The Plantation of Ulster can be considered as the starting point of an historical process which has resulted in the contemporary ‘troubles’ between Unionist and Republican, Protestant and Catholic.

In 1653 a union of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland was secured. By this Act of Settlement, Ireland was portrayed as a conquered territory. By that time Ulster had become the most British and most Protestant part of Ireland, although a large Irish Catholic population was also located there, and the rest of Ireland remained Catholic. James II, a Catholic King of England, sought to reverse Roman Catholic discrimination, but was challenged by William III, a Protestant, who defeated him and his Catholic supporters at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, an event still commemorated by Unionists in contemporary Ulster.

Figure 3: Contemporary wall mural of the Battle of the Boyne in Northern Ireland © Nezumi Dumousseau

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Williamite wars reinforced Catholic discrimination by imposing the Penal Laws excluding Catholics from the army, preventing them from taking part in politics and depriving them of access to education (Jenkins, 1997, p. 93). Particularly repressive conditions in County Armagh gave rise to bitter sectarian strife. In 1795 a battle between Catholics and Protestants at the Diamond encouraged the creation of the Unionist Orange Society, which was later known as the Orange Order, organised to protect Protestant interests. The Act of Union of 1801 put Protestants under the formal protection of the British – now the Union – Parliament.

In 1829 Roman Catholics were emancipated, the British Test Act provided political equality for most purposes, but did little to alleviate discrimination in Ireland for all but the landed gentry. Still, the dramatic success of the Roman Catholic Daniel O’Connell’s emancipation movement provoked Protestant hostility and led to its violent suppression in 1843. The nineteenth century witnessed a succession of Irish crises. Foremost among these was the Great Famine of the 1840s which desolated the countryside (Hayden, 1997), forcing large numbers of Irish people to migrate to the British mainland, North America, Australia and New Zealand. In Ulster, particularly in the industrial powerhouse of Belfast, Protestants held the monopoly of skilled jobs. Catholics were to be mostly found in non-skilled jobs, a divide which still exists in contemporary Northern Ireland.

The late nineteenth century saw ‘Britain’s Irish Question’ elevated to the top of the political agenda. Prompted by a conservative Irish nationalist movement, successive Liberal governments attempted to introduce some degree of Irish self-government in the form of ‘Irish Home Rule’. Unsuccessful in 1886 and 1893, thanks to the determined opposition of Protestant Unionists and English Conservatives (and Liberal Unionists, too) a bill was finally passed in 1914, only for Home Rule to be postponed once the First World War began that August. Soon, however, the peaceful and conservative Irish campaign for Home Rule found itself displaced by a radical Republican movement for Irish independence, which organised an abortive uprising in Dublin at Easter 1916 which declared an Irish Republic. The harsh British repression of the Easter Rising, which saw the summary execution of the ringleaders of the revolt, lead to the rise of Sinn Fein, the emergence of a guerrilla force, the Irish Republican Army (the IRA), and the Irish War of Independence, 1919–21. Escalating violence further divided the country into the Republican majority and the Protestant minority located in the enclave of Ulster. It led to an unsustainable situation culminating in the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which divided the country into two self-governing parts.

As a result, Northern Ireland was formed by six of the nine counties of Ulster which remained within the British state. Ulster Protestants opposed leaving the UK and rejected the possibility of becoming a minority within a largely Catholic Irish state. The three remaining counties of Ulster, together with the 26 counties of the rest of Ireland, left the UK to become a dominion of the British Empire known as the Irish Free State. Eamon de Valera became its first president. In 1937, de Valera replaced the title of the Irish Free State with the word Eire (Ireland) and in 1949 Britain recognised Ireland as an independent republic and consolidated the position of Northern Ireland as a united province with England. Sadly, the partition of Ireland did little to promote a political settlement between the Unionist majority and the Republican minority in Northern Ireland. This inevitably lead to widespread conflict and a de facto civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, widening a political chasm which the post-1994 peace process and the paramilitary ceasefires have only begun to bridge.

2 The making of the UK

2.5 Summary of Section 1

• England, Scotland and Wales are nations.
• Wales was conquered by the English in 1282 and its parliamentary union with England took place in 1536.
• The United Kingdom of Great Britain was formed by the Act of Union of 1707, although the term Great Britain had been in use since 1603, when James VI of Scotland became James I of England (including Wales). Later unions created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and, after 1921, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

3 Nation, state and nation-state

3.1 What makes a nation, a state or a nation-state?

Why do England, Scotland and Wales take part in the Six Nations rugby championship alongside Italy, Ireland and France? Are they all ‘nations’? What do we mean by calling them ‘nations’? The nation has become one of the most contested concepts of our times. Scholars, politicians and political activists present different definitions of the nation, usually focusing on a variety of cultural, political, psychological, territorial, ethnic and sociological principles. The lack of an agreement on what constitutes the nation suggests there is some difficulty in dealing with such a complex phenomenon. The crux of the matter probably embraces the link that has been established between nation and state and to the common practice of using the nation as a source of political legitimacy. Recognition as a nation grants different rights to a community that claims to comprise a single national unit. It usually implies an attachment to a particular territory, a shared culture and history and the assertion of the right to self-determination. Of course, as we shall see, nations are not internally homogeneous and are affected by internal and external migration flows. Yet, to define a specific community as a nation involves the more or less explicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the state which claims to represent that nation. If the nation does not possess a state of its own, it then implicitly acknowledges the nation’s right to self-government involving some degree of political autonomy. This, in turn, may or may not lead to a claim for independence or secession from the state which claims sovereignty over the nation.

The nation, however, cannot be viewed in isolation and a clear-cut distinction has to be drawn between three main concepts: state, nation and nation-state. Max Weber defines the ’state’ as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber et al., 1991, p. 78). The concept ‘nation’ refers to ‘a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself’ (Guibernau, 1996, p. 47). This definition attributes five dimensions to the nation:

• psychological (consciousness of forming a group)
• cultural
• territorial
• political
• historical.

People who share such characteristics are referred to as having a common national identity. It is the sharing of a common national identity, expressed in terms of culture, language, religion, ways of life, common memories, shared past experiences and territory, that makes people feel they belong to the same community and have a certain degree of solidarity towards their fellow-nationals. However, a nation-state, being different from a nation and a state, has to be distinguished from the other two. The nation-state is a modern political institution. First, it is a state that both claims and exercises the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory. Second, it is a state that seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means of homogenisation, creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them. In seeking to engender a sense of belonging among its citizens the nation-state demands their loyalty and fosters their national identity.

The nation-state aspires to consolidate the nation where it already exists, but, should the nation-state rule over a territory containing different nations, parts of nations or ethnic groups, it tends to prioritise the culture and language of a particular nation. These then become dominant under the state’s protection. For instance, at its inception, the Spanish state imposed the Castilian language and culture on the various peoples living within its territory, notably Catalonia and the Basque country, which had previously enjoyed their own independent institutions and laws. In the case of Catalonia, these institutions were dismantled after 1714 as Spanish troops conquered and occupied Barcelona.

The nation-state has exercised control of institutions and laws, the national media and the national education system. It has variously sought to nominate and promote a single official language, sometimes a single religion, and disseminated a specific version of the nation-state’s history based on remembering, ignoring or forgetting certain key events, and recovering and inventing national symbols, ceremonies, rituals, heroes, sacred places and traditions. Such strategies have been consistently employed in order to create and sustain a homogeneous national identity among its citizens. However, numerous examples prove that very few nation-states have managed to successfully homogenise their populations. Differences have prevailed in spite of the nation-state’s historical strategies to instil a common identity among its otherwise diverse citizenry.

3 Nation, state and nation-state

3.2 Sub-state forms of nationalism

The advancement of democracy in contemporary Western nation-states and the intensification of globalisation processes have encouraged the re-emergence of nationalist movements representing oppressed or silenced nations that demand the right to self-determination. In the case of ethnic groups formed by people of immigrant origin, democracy has provided them with the tools to pursue the right to develop and practice their indigenous culture and language alongside those of the host country. One very important point in any theory of ethnicity concerns its dual nature: there is an ethnicity that members of a group claim and feel for themselves, but there is also the ethnicity which is attributed to them by others. There is also the more complex possibility that the claimed or felt ethnicity of group members may be shaped by that which is attributed to them by others. Although nation-states often corrode subordinate ethnicities, some nation-states may define themselves as ‘multicultural’ or ‘multi-ethnic’. This is the case in the UK, and also in the USA and other countries.

The rise of sub-state forms of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere can be interpreted as being a product of globalisation. The globalisation of the economy and social relations has contributed to the transformation of the nation-state and also seems to have contributed to the intensification of regional forms of nationalism. Globalisation, which involves greater awareness of diversity as it stresses interdependence between peoples, markets and cultures, is not an even process. Access to the technology that facilitates globalisation is restricted to certain nations, individuals and groups being dependent on certain means and resources. On the one hand, globalisation contains the potential for creating a world in which a greater number of cultures interact with one another. On the other, it also contains the potential for cultural homogenisation, where a single culture expands globally to the detriment of other cultures. This perceived threat is one of the key factors contributing to the revitalisation of minority cultures, many of which are struggling to find a niche in the global marketplace. Control over education and the mass media are crucial for nations who wish to promote their own languages and specific cultures. However, these nations should acknowledge that their languages and cultures will have to survive alongside more powerful ones that are gradually permeating – and influencing – all aspects of life. Minority cultures struggling to survive can only do so by entering an unequal contest with a major global culture.

One of the key elements in the construction of national identity is a shared history formed by memories of a community having suffered and thrived together. Making history not only involves selecting some specific events critical to the life of the nation, but also includes the collective forgetting of some events. It even leads to the modification and invention of memorable and dramatic experiences endured by the community. History emphasizes the transcendent character of the nation, expanding well beyond the life span of any individual. Equally importantly, history also portrays the nation as a community of fate.

4 Defining centre and periphery

4.1 National identities and UK politics

Why do British people speak ‘English’ and not ‘British’? Why is it easier to travel from London to any British city than to travel from Bedford to Leamington Spa? Why are the National Gallery, the British Museum and Tate Modern all in London? Why does London house the Stock Exchange? This has to do with the pivotal role played by England in the constitution of the UK and by the designation of London as the capital of the UK.

Within any given country, we are likely to be able to establish a distinction between centre and periphery. The centre generally exerts political, economic and cultural power over the periphery, which is always dependent, tends to lack resources and often suffers from insufficient investment. The distinction between centre and periphery manifests itself, at least, at three different levels.

First, between the dominant nation or ethnic group within the country and the other nations and ethnic groups. For example, England’s centrality in relation to Wales or Scotland. Second, between the country’s capital city and other cities. For example, London in relation to Cardiff, Belfast or Edinburgh. Third, between different areas within the same nation. For example, the Scottish Lowlands, where the majority of the Scots live, the greatest concentration of Scottish industry is located and the main Scottish cities (Edinburgh and Glasgow) are placed, acts as a centre in relation to the Hebrides and the Highlands.

What are the consequences of being situated at the centre or in the periphery? If we return to the distinction between England and Scotland or Wales, we can observe that:

• England contains the capital city of the country in which the key institutions of the UK state are located.
• The Queen has her main residence in London.
• The greatest concentration of jobs and industry are in England, although it could be argued that England does not enjoy an even distribution of industry itself: in terms of prosperity the south-east predominates. This illustrates the notion that peripheries are also to be found within the centre and the other way round.
• All foreign consulates and embassies have their key representatives in London, although some of them may have further representatives in other cities.
• England was the heart of the British Empire and led the emergence of the Union by incorporating to itself, through various means, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.
• English, the language which originated in England, has become the language spoken by the majority of the British people (although some British citizens may not be able to speak it, and the government has decided to implement some measures to change this and make competence in English a requirement for British citizenship). Also, English is the language spoken in a number of Commonwealth countries and those countries formed by a substantial number of immigrants originating in the UK; for example, the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

Therefore, we can see some of the consequences of being located at the centre. For instance, the centre holds the most powerful governance institutions, and it enjoys greater economic and financial activity, generally resulting in greater wealth. In short, the centre rules.

Now consider how the place where you live relates to others in terms of centre and periphery. You will discover that the same place may act as a ‘centre’ in some cases and as a ‘periphery’ in some other contexts. For example, Edinburgh represents the periphery when compared with London, but Edinburgh is the centre when considered in relation to Aberdeen or Lerwick. If we consider the EU, then Brussels stands as the centre and the UK and London are located in Europe’s periphery, not only for geographical reasons but also because of the UK’s decision not to join the euro. This illustrates the complexity of the centre–periphery relationship and the different factors that can be employed when measuring a city, a region, and even a country’s status as a centre or periphery.

The struggle for power and resources, which takes place between the centre and the periphery but also takes place within the periphery, may complicate matters even further. For example, devolution to Northern Ireland has resulted in the enhancement of Belfast as a capital city, placed within the UK’s periphery and turned into a stronger centre within Northern Ireland. Yet the existence of sharp internal divisions between Unionists and Republicans adds greater complexity to the development of Belfast and Northern Ireland in general. For instance, it could be argued that confrontation between radical sectors of the Unionist and the Republican communities reveal fragility and great difficulty in implementing any development project for the area. Hence, internal conflict within a periphery can result in the perpetuation of its peripheral status by hampering investment and disrupting development plans which, to succeed, require the support of the whole community. Yet, some Unionists feel that their dominant position within Northern Ireland is being threatened by devolution. For this reason, they fear and oppose change. In contrast, the majority of the Republican movement has supported devolution, although some have become disillusioned at the impasse the peace process has often found itself at, typified by the suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly and its power sharing executive. A long history of mistrust, suffering and violence cuts across both communities, factors which have undoubtedly played a key role in the perpetuation of Northern Ireland’s peripheral status, marked by low investment, high unemployment and a lower standard of living than the rest of the UK.

A further question concerns how those who belong to the periphery feel about their own status. Usually, awareness of one’s peripheral position is not very pleasant and people tend to develop a feeling of resentment against the privileges they perceive as being enjoyed by others. In the UK, the centrality of England has contributed to the fostering of nationalist feelings in both Scotland and Wales, which have been almost totally dependent on English rule exerted from London. The demand for some degree of autonomy for Scotland and Wales is closely connected with the desire of the Scots and Welsh to reverse the peripheral role their nations have played for centuries.

While nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales invoke various arguments, such movements invariably appeal to history, evoking the time when their nations were free and enjoyed their own independent institutions. They blame the homogenising policies imposed by England for the weakening of their indigenous languages and cultures. Their grievances include complaints about lack of investment and English exploitation of their natural resources, as Scottish Nationalists claimed in regard to North Sea oil in the 1970s. A further argument employed by nationalists in Scotland and Wales, but also in Catalonia, Quebec, Flanders and Veneto, among many different nations without a state of their own, concerns their wish to strengthen democracy. In their view, devolution and self-determination, regardless of how they are defined, involve giving a voice to the people, increasing their participation and allowing those affected by decisions to have a greater influence over those decisions. This is why, among those who support nationalist claims in Scotland and Wales, we find not only people who invoke historical, cultural, symbolic and emotional arguments, but also those who see devolution as a further step in the development of democratic practices. This feeling was strongly felt among a substantial number of Labour activists and voters who were persuaded to embrace devolution even though they opposed the very idea of an independent Scotland.

After the 1997 general election the Labour government undertook a programme of far reaching constitutional reform that could well transform the UK from a unitary state, ruled by the centre, into a decentralised unitary state. Its programme of Scottish and Welsh devolution was a response to longstanding demands for autonomy advanced by some of the peoples of Scotland and Wales.